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my opinion, democracy as a way of life is closely connected with the quan-
tity and quality of labour of its bearers. The foundations of democracy can-
not be built under conditions of redistributive economy (Bessonova, 2006), 
where the value of the honest labour of creative minority is ignored.  
 
8. The power elite response 
As many democratic observers and organizers of the above protest 
meetings stated, in order to extinguish a protest wave the power elite usual-
ly employed three successful tactics. The first was deception and secrecy. 
The authorities promised the concerned public to investigate the case, to set 
up special commissions (a parliamentary commission of inquiry, in particu-
lar), they invited politically engaged experts, worked in full secrecy and 
many months later said that the protestors had been wrong and they, ie the 
authorities, were right, acting in strict accordance with law. The second tac-
tics aimed at breaking the unity of leading protest forces into numerous 
competing groups. The publicity (glasnost) of all actions of the too adver-
sarial sides could be the only remedy against such tactics (Parchomenko, 
2011). Last but not least was the setting up of the All-Russian popular front 
and formation from it of a mix of counter-movements, rallies and meetings 
in support of the existing political system. 
Theoretically, the authorities could use several strategies to meet the 
protestors’ challenges. First, they could try to guide the process of social 
renovation themselves. But for this they had to leave the cocoon and stop 
shying away from their fellow citizens. Another variant: to get away by 
chucking a few important but not key figures. Plus to mobilize Russian prov-
inces by spreading a myth that the protestors are rich, uppish and fed-up 
people. A more advantageous variant might be leadership of movement to-
ward modernization, but this necessitates a partner-like dialogue with the 
opponents, to which the government is not accustomed yet. Finally, the vari-
ant of ‘tightening the screws’ in the atmosphere of all-out corruption is 
viewed by experts as an unlikely one (Gorbachev and Samarina, 2011: 1, 3). 
What actually happened? At first, the government pretended that 
nothing had happened at all: there had been and would be protests, but the 
government strategy would remain the same notwithstanding. Taking the 
lead of the opposition movement was out of the question. One more princi-
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ple of the power elite is known well: ‘we do not give up our fellows’. There-
fore the protestors’ proposal to remove a few top functionaries had not been 
accepted either. The attempt of Kremlin political technologists to present the 
situation as if mass protests in Moscow had been organized by sated and cor-
rupt bourgeois against labouring and poor provincials appeared to be too 
risky politically for the officials themselves. Neither had the revivification of 
the external enemy image, that is, representation of the opposition as the US 
agent allegedly attempting to trigger a new ‘orange revolution’, brought 
about anything except a chill in the US relations with Russia. 
Then a different instrument, tested more than once, was put into op-
eration: counter-meetings under the slogan ‘We have things we don’t want to 
lose!’ organized by supporters of the present ruling elite. This tactics proved 
effective. Putin’s supporters mobilized not only the forces of the ruling party 
and the All-Russian Popular Front but also huge numbers of population 
groups dependent on the government (ie the abovementioned budgetniki): 
teachers, the medical profession, public service personnel, etc. What was bad 
was that these people were compelled to attend the meetings and rallies 
(sometimes they even had to drive from other towns), and this fact soon be-
came known (Garmazhapova, 2011: 3-7). It was a real shock, for instance, to 
both teachers and students. Nevertheless, the opposition leaders understood 
well that the authorities were able to recruit practically an unlimited number 
of ‘participants’ who would attend such counter-meetings. More than that, 
the new tactics for raising the per cent of pro-Putin votes had been invented 
by Kremlin technologists. It just appeared that there were a lot of plants of 
uninterrupted production cycle whose workers should vote in accordance 
with authorized list of voters at special electoral districts (Mostovszchikov, 
2012). 
After presidential elections campaign it became obvious that: (1) 
there is no changes in power elite. One could observe the exchange of the 
known cadres between new presidential administration and new government. 
The tandem cocoon remained the same; (2) the fact that the prime-minister 
D. Medvedev has become the official leader of the United Russia political 
party whereas the president V.Putin has remained an unofficial leader of All-
Russian popular front pointed out that the tandem would want to construct 
be-party political system as in the US; (3) the process of multiplication of 
protest forms primarily emerged in capitals across the country confirmed the 
idea that capitals still remained the engines of social and political changes in 
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Russia; (4) during the Spring 2012, the protestors showed its flexibility in 
using  various forms of  action repertoire: pickets, meetings, permanent and 
mobile camps, walks along the city’s boulevards with prominent writers, 
artists, painters as well as the counter-claims and litigations. All in all, in this 
period the protest actions embraced more than 30 cities. It is indicative that 
protest organisers in order to avoid clashes with the police used to practice 
carnival form of collective action open to all who wish to join it; (5) but this 
carnivalisation does not mean the decline of self-organisation. On the con-
trary, the new forms of self-organisation mushroomed. Each initiative group 
of the movement developed a particular form of activity ranging from the 
project the ‘Observer’ (of the electoral procedures of the past and forthcom-
ing elections) to protestor’s camps with disputes and lectures and full ser-
vices including voluntary guards. The further the more an internet is used as 
a universal tool (for communication, fundraising, learning by doing, etc.); 
and (6) finally, the leadership of the movement is still an open question. On 
the one hand, the leaders of its radical wing who were sentenced many times 
have authority over a good deal of protestors. On the other hand, the young 
middle-class protestors move forth the leaders from their ranks. They incline 
to support the public figures which offer the concrete, mainly short-term, 
goals and programmes. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The very fact that for the first time after democratic upsurge (ie after 
perestroika) Russia was encumbered with mass protest meetings is rather 
indicative because it has already a set of political consequences. First, it 
means not only that Russian society is politically awakened, but that its con-
fidence in the current political system has been exhausted. It became clear 
that substantial changes in existing political system are at stake.    
Second, the protest mobilization revealed that contemporary Russian 
society is split into numerous antagonistic groups: the centre vs. the prov-
inces; the ‘new middle-class’, a challenger of changes, vs. the adherents of 
stability; the TV-people vs. the Internet-people; the internationalists vs. the 
patriots; the radical patriots vs. the responsible nationalists. It means that 
mobilization has revealed the true disposition of social forces. 
